Conditions Against the Torah in Monetary Law

Bava Metzia (7:11) | Yisrael Bankier | 2 months ago

The Mishnah (7:11) teaches that if one makes a condition against Torah law then the conditional is null and void. In other words, the act is confirmed even if the condition was not fulfilled.

The Gemara (94a) explains that the scope of this law is the subject of debate. R' Yehuda maintains that if the stipulation was built into a monetary agreement, then it would work. For example, if a man betroths a woman on condition that he will not provide her with clothing, which is a biblical obligation, then the condition would stand. R' Meir however disagrees, maintaining that they would be betrothed and he would nonetheless be required to fulfil this Torah obligation. We shall try to understand this debate.

The Ramban (Bava Kama 126b) explains that the reason why R' Shimon maintains that these conditions work with monetary law is because "the Torah only obligated [one party] if the other party wanted it". In other words, it appears that R' Shimon maintains that what he is doing does conflict with the Torah law. However, it is fine, because the obligation only has force if the beneficiary wants it. R' Meir however would then disagree that the Torah law does not have this inbuilt flexibility.

The Chazon Ish (Even HaEzer 56:17) however cites the Rashba who understands that when R' Shimon allows these conditions, he agrees that the Torah law is still in place. Nevertheless, since it generates a monetary obligation, the other party can willingly forgo that "debt".

The Chazon Ish continues that it would seem, according to this understanding, that the debate between R' Meir and R' Shimon is not substantive, but how we understand that language that is used when they make the condition. R' Shimon understand that it is a monetary waiver whereas R' Meir understands that it is attempting to contradict Torah law. Both would agree however that one cannot make a condition that directly contradicts Torah law.

The Chazon Ish however cites several Gemarot which imply that the debate is more substantive. For example, the Gemara in Ketubot (51a) discusses whether a woman can write into her ketubah that it should be considered as if she already received half its value, to reduce the value of the ketubah from the minimum Torah requirement. The Gemara explains that this is part of the debate between R' Meir and R' Shimon and does not appear to be because of any ambiguity in the text.

The Chazon Ish therefore understands the Rashba differently. It is not that what is involved in this case is forgoing a monetary debt. Rather it is a question of how we treat forgoing monetary rights. According to R' Shimon forgoing a monetary Torah right is similar to forgoing any monetary debt and not tantamount to uprooting a Torah law. R' Meir however would argue that since he would be forgoing his right from that outset, at the time of when the agreement is formed, it is no longer similar to forgoing a debt, but rather considered uproot a Torah law (considering it never had the chance to set it).

Download